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Ludger Pries 
Transnational Migration: New Challenges for Nation States and New Opportunities for 
Regional and Global Development 
 
1. The New Importance of Transnational Migration 
Migration movements are not like one-way streets. They do originate from insecure and lead 
to (slightly) securer regions and from areas lacking employment and living opportunities to 
areas which are hoped to offer better economic, political, cultural and/or social prospects. 
However, even after the wave of emigration by Europeans due to industrialisation and 
urbanisation in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, estimates suggest that about 
a third or half of all emigrants returned to their regions of origin. Apart from the ideal types of 
emigrants and ‘returned emigrants’ or return-migrants, history shows that there have always 
been people for whom migration and the change of places is not a nonrecurring and unusual 
undertaking, but actually a way of living. 
If, for example, one looks at the development of homo sapiens over the past 150.000 years, 
then a nomadic way of life makes up more than nine tenths of our history. Living in the same 
place for many generations is a relatively new ‘invention’ by human evolution and probably 
only practiced by a minority of all people. Natural disasters, epidemics and military 
confrontations have periodically forced groups and even entire ethnic people to ‘clear places’ 
in the double sense of preparing places (from wood, undergrowth etc.) for living and of 
leaving and abandon places in order to live in another place. However, departing without 
being forced to do so has also always been like a magnet, causing people to leave their 
homes (their ‘usual environment’) either in search of utopia as the ‘place where no man has 
been’ or as the gold-digger’s dream of material fortune. This combination of pressure and 
suction, of economically poor groups being forced or the voluntary departure in search of 
fortune by others can be observed in many examples: the crusades which began about nine 
centuries ago (and between 1096 and 1097 alone mobilized approximately one hundred 
thousand people to make the trip to the ‘promised land’), the mass migration of people in 
Europe between the second and sixth century, the history of the ‘discovery’ and conquest of 
America half a millennium ago or the mass emigration of millions of Europeans at the turn of 
the 19th century.  
The specific quality of migration dynamics in the 21st century stems from the improvement in 
quality and availability to a broader spectrum of people of communication and transport 
possibilities. This makes migration processes more complex and less concentrated in the 
classical types of emigration/immigration or return-migration. The renewed increase in global 
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migration streams which can be observed since the 1980s is not simply a transitional 
phenomenon. It is much more likely that the naturally or religiously justified expectation of a 
way of life bound to a place over many generations was merely a phenomenon of the ‘simple 
modern age’ and the belief in the nation building project as the most important way of 
grouping people. The assumption of an increase in international migration movements and 
their impact on society is sustained by a combination of various factors. Violently carried out 
ethnical conflicts and ecological factors such as soil erosion and water shortage intensify the 
continual migration from rural to urban areas. The progressing disintegration of traditional 
rural social milieus, the globally omnipresent projections and visions of living conditions and 
lifestyles in the pockets of affluence due to mass communication media and, finally, the 
extension and price-reduction of continually improving mass transport and communication 
technologies reduce the threshold to migrate and at the same time cumulatively contribute to 
further migration. In the light of these social driving forces, all government efforts to regulate 
migration streams at will are only of limited effect. 
Next to the forms of international emigration/immigration (in the sense of a unidirectional and 
nonrecurring change of residence) that have been dominant up until now, a form of 
transnational migration can be increasingly observed whereby the (1) way of life, (2) symbol 
systems and (3) artefacts of these transmigrants as their social spaces between residences 
or geographic spaces are stretched over various countries. In this way, the boundaries of 
social spaces are redefined and are no longer consistent with territorial or geographic 
spaces. An example for the relevance of artefacts for transnational social spaces can be 
seen in technical communications media such as the telephone, fax, internet cafés or local 
radio stations. The fact that private households have modern and expensive fax machines or 
that well equipped and frequented internet cafés can be found in seemingly extremely poor 
areas in developing countries cannot be reduced to the isolated local lifestyles of people 
living there. Instead, the decisive factor is that the social everyday practices of these people 
includes daily (or at least very regular) communication with family or household members 
who live thousands of kilometres away as work migrants. 
Transnational migration also brings forth novel forms of symbol systems, such as Turkish-
German literature as published by Feridun Zaimoglu, transnational migrant music as brought 
forth by Manu Chao or British-Indian fashion. These symbol systems can only be understood 
by considering the pluri-local and multi-cultural lifestyles of transmigrants. Their self-
acknowledgement and social positioning are multiple insofar as they are not based upon one 
contiguous coherent reference system (of the particular sending- or receiving society, or of a 
Diaspora community). Rather, elements of the sending and receiving areas are combined 
and transformed into something new and transnational. Holidays and celebrations are also 
often redefined in the context of transnational social spaces. The traditional religious local 
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village festival which used to be arranged by the congregations’ minister by mobilising small 
harvest donations by congregation members in honour of the village saint may change into a 
colourful secular regional event. This event could then be sponsored by migrants’ foreign 
earnings and represent less of a display of faith by the congregation than offer a platform for 
migrant families to show off their economic ascent achieved by work migration. 
The social practice of these transnational social spaces includes the development of 
transnational survival strategies and household economics. Transnational households are 
characterised by the (dynamic and changing during the lifecourse) distribution over different 
spaces, persons and generations of the roles and functions of the acquisition of money, 
cultivation of land, domestic work, sustaining contacts and child education. Transnational 
household economies are significantly more complex when compared to the traditional 
allocation of functions, for example with a male head of family who leaves his family of two or 
three generations for a limited period of time as a guest- or seasonal worker and regularly 
remits money to those who have ‘remained at home’. Households of transnational migrants 
are not merely characterised by a traditional core family comprising two or three generations, 
as some research about work migration between Mexico and the USA show. These 
households almost always include relatives of further degrees (siblings, uncles, aunts, etc.) 
and other groups of persons (such as godchildren or friends). 
The allocation of roles can vary greatly in the course of time: The father who had initially 
migrated from Mexico returns to work on the extension of the house building and to take care 
of farming; the mother of already slightly older children subsequently leaves the household in 
the Mexican village to do domestic work for a middle-class family in the USA; perhaps both 
parents might migrate and delegate the responsibility of child rearing and household 
management in Mexico to the (grand)parents; later, maybe even the oldest child will migrate 
and finance the bulk of household economics for the family members remaining in Mexico. 
Those child may also return to Mexico for studies or to acquire money and their grandfather 
could work as a gardener in the USA. While in the case of traditional emigrants remittances 
decrease over time and eventually – usually after deciding to remain permanently in the 
receiving country - cease altogether, in the case of transnational migration they do not stop 
to play a consistent and important role.  
 
2. New forms of transnational economics 
Generally speaking, a sharp increase in remittances from migration can be observed since 
the 1970s. According to data by the World Bank, the yearly volume of remittances to 
developing countries alone from work migration during the thirty years up until 2002 had 
grown by a factor of ten to about 80 billion US-Dollars. On the other hand, estimates by the 
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United Nations and the World Bank show that the number of migrants worldwide has only 
slightly more than doubled to about 175 million in 2000. This data is to be interpreted 
cautiously, however. For example, only rough estimates of the amount of undocumented 
migration can be made. Even countries which are able to control their borders relatively 
effectively (such as Germany or the USA) cannot avoid that for every ten registered 
migrants, one migrant is not registered. Despite the data problems: an increase in 
remittances of the factor ten as compared to an increase in international migration volume by 
the factor two seems to be at least an invitation to reflect more carefully about the quality of 
international migration and their shifting patterns. 
Notwithstanding these problems in the exact collection of data (or precisely because of 
these), the significance of remittances from work migration which has grown over the past 
two to three decades can hardly be overestimated. Of all transfer flows to the developing 
countries over the past decade, only migrant remittances showed a positive growth 
tendency, while flows into capital markets, foreign direct investment and public 
(development) aid tend to have receded. In absolute terms, India leads the list of remittance 
receiving countries with about 21.7 billion US-Dollars in 2004, followed by China and Mexico 
(21.3 and 18.1 billion US-Dollars respectively). Remittances make up more that a tenth of the 
entire gross national product in countries such as Lesotho, Jordan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Albania, Nicaragua, Yemen, The Republic of Moldova, El Salvador and Jamaica (World Bank 
2005). For a great deal of these countries, transfers from work migrants range among the 
three most important sources of foreign currency income. Foreign currency income from 
remittances can be greater than income from tourism, even in a large country such as 
Mexico with a population of over 100 million and a highly developed tourism sector. 
Compared to the net flow of development aid, remittances from work migration are at least 
twice and up to ten times greater in large developing and threshold countries such as 
Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, India, Mexico or 
Morocco. Aside from the purely quantitative importance of remittances, the manner in which 
they are transferred is of great importance. On the one hand, small to middle-sized 
international banks reap profits from business related to these money transfers. This is true 
of the American Western Union bank which has been able to make considerable profits in 
this line of business by charging high fees and commissions. If one looks at the yellow pages 
in Latin-American countries and checks the entries for example beneath ‚remesas familiares’, 
the dynamics of this form of money transfer, even in the smallest provincial town, become 
very clear. 
Beside the official and registered transfer channels via banks and supermarket chains, 
informal transfer channels are also very significant. Among these is the Hawala system 
practiced primarily in Pakistan and India. In this case, agreements based solely on trust and 
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personal acquaintance to deposit a certain sum of money in a certain currency in any place 
in the world are much more timely than official bank transfers which lead to the out payment 
in another (or the same) currency in any other place on earth and incur comparatively low 
costs. Similarly, informal transport networks of money and goods are organised, for example, 
as in the Chinese (parental networks) concept of Guanxi or the Latin-American compadrazgo 
(godfather) system.  
These transport mechanisms for goods, capital and services form a grey area between legal 
formality, legitimate informality and clandestine illegality which may undermine official 
controls and therefore also state sovereignty – a practice more or less also adhered to by 
international enterprises. Many different and highly differentiated forms of transnational 
economic transaction structures have been established. These include relations based on 
family or kinship as in the case of work migrants, or structures based on authority and 
external control as in the case of organised crime and international terrorism. These 
structures evade traditional national and international public regulation on the one hand, but 
on the other, they interact with governments and international business enterprises via 
complex structures. 
Examples such as the Western Union Bank or many regional bus- and airlines demonstrate 
how formal international business organisations benefit from undocumented or illegal 
migration and are possibly even reliant on these for stability. Traditional and informal family 
or kinship network structures such as the Chinese Guanxi can become essential for the 
viability of by all means significant formal transnational business organisations and value 
chains. Conversely, international enterprises may deliberately exploit transnational structures 
of organised crime, for example to distribute (untaxed) cigarettes or to obtain or dispose of 
environmentally harmful or other dangerous substances and materials, just as they may be 
extorted and thus themselves become victims of such transnational criminal organisations. 
Finally, governments, political parties or local governments may try to exploit the capital- and 
human resources of transnational migration, for example by campaigning for the Senegalese 
election in the migrant suburbs of Paris (Salzbrunn 2001), by carrying through a publicity tour 
for Mexican regional irrigation projects aimed at work migrants in New York (Smith 1995), or 
by trying to integrate highly qualified Indian IT work emigrants to the USA to join national 
development schemes in the Indian software industry (Athreye 2005). 
Transnational family and household strategies in the context of work migration rely on 
already existing transnational organisations, communication possibilities, established 
channels for money, goods and passenger traffic as well as existing traditional social 
institutions. All of these required factors will, on the other hand, be developed further and 
stabilised due to the migrants’ behaviour. The lack of communication and transport 
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possibilities would entail significantly less transnational migration. However, without 
transnational migration, the critical mass stabilizing global communication and transport 
possibilities would be substantially smaller.  
Because increasing economic transactions due to work migration often take place beyond 
governmentally controlled dealings and beneath the level of formalised business 
organisations, they often do not receive as much attention within the current discourse on 
globalisation. The latter usually bemoans the inability of governmental politics to regulate 
globalised capital flows and corporate strategies. Focusing on this alone, there is indeed little 
hope of impacting upon internationalisation processes in general and upon international 
migration in especial. But – as will be argued in the next section – besides new challenges, 
the transnational type of migration also offers some new opportunities. 
 
3. Challenges and opportunities of transnational migration 
If transnational migration actually is of growing importance, its economic, social, legal and 
political implications have to be considered carefully. In general, the transnational type of 
international migration processes is not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but the challenges and opportunities 
have to be discussed for different actor groups, conditions and dimensions of the migration 
processes. At least five important aspects could be identified. 
 
The limited impact of governments’ and State control 
The traditional understanding of international migration in the forms of immigration, return-
migration or Diaspora-migration includes the notion of State control over the migration flows. 
Countries like Canada or Australia define clear policies and politics of immigration, e.g. invite 
people with higher education degrees, without criminal background and with a minimum of 
investment capital to live in their country. In the same way and according to this idea, the 
European Union defines criteria for refugees and asylum seekers as well as for labour 
migrants and aims at controlling the external Schengen boarders according to these outlines.  
The USA developed programs for seasonal labour migrants (e.g. for the fruit and vegetable 
harvest in California) or other time limited labour migrants (e.g. the Bracero-program from 
1942-1964) who in general are considered as return-migrants going definitely back to their 
countries of origin after a specific period defined by the ‘inviting’ State. In the same way, the 
German ‘guestworker’-programs were developed for labour migrants and signed by Germany 
and all the sending countries’ States (like Italy, Spain, Greece or Turkey) based on the idea 
of two to four years stays of migrant workers who afterwards – in order not to develop roots 
in Germany – were going to be interchanged by other migrant workers.   
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In the same way, the sovereign nation states follow the international rules for diplomatic 
corps and the corresponding treatment of diplomatic migrants, they define the legal and tax 
conditions for residing of expatriates of foreign companies and of members of political, 
scientific and religious foundations or other types of corporations. All these types of migrants 
could be coined Diaspora-migrants because their ongoing and continuous framework of 
reference is the ‘promised land’, the State or company they got their mission from. Whether 
they return or stay or go to another country does not depend on individual or household 
decisions but on pronouncements of their organisation or State they feel their main loyalty 
and destination with.  
In all these cases of the three ideal types of immigrants, return-migrants and Diaspora-
migrants there does definitely exist a certain amount of undocumented or illegal migrants. 
For instance, temporal (return or Diaspora-) migrants who overstay their limited legal 
permission period and then try to become a legalized immigrant based on state regulations 
like in Spain or on legalisation campaigns like in France 1998 or in the USA with the IRCA 
1986. But in general, in migration theory and politics one important assumption is that States 
are able to control their borders and to supervise the boarder crossing migration flows. This 
picture becomes more complex if transnational migration is considered. To some extend it is 
legal and documented migration. But the majority of transnational migrants in many cases 
are undocumented; or they enter legally a country and become undocumented labour 
migrants (by overstaying the legal visa period or by working with an exclusive permission for 
tourism or education). About ninety percent of nearly 700 surveyed Mexican labour migrants 
to the USA informed to work or to have worked as undocumented migrants (Pries 2004b).  
If international migration would take place only in the ideal typical way of immigration, return-
migration and Diaspora-migration, the challenge of effective State control over boarders 
would not be as dramatic: immigration would lead to settled people, return-migration would 
result in long term accommodation in the country of origin, and the vast majority of  Diaspora-
migration would happen in the legal framework of the receiving State. But if there is a 
constant coming and going, if transnational migrants are not following a long term integration 
strategy in one place but planning their lives in medium term steps and sequentially, if their 
identities and loyalties are spanned between different countries, then the State control of 
complex, network based and bi-directional migration dynamics could become quite difficult 
and a challenge for the nation states. Empirical studies suggest that it is mainly this type of 
transnational migration that complicates the legal control of migration flows. 
In the case of Mexican-USA-migration all state attempts to restrict and control the migration 
flows, e.g. in the Tijuana/San Diego region, re-routed the main streams of undocumented 
boarder crossing and raised up the prices for migrant trafficking (Bustamante/Martínez 
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1979). In the case of Germany, the ‘guestworker’ programs signed with a lot of countries 
since the 1950s led to more or less formalised and controlled labour migration of the return-
migrants’ type and later of the immigrants’ type. But once a certain level of personal social 
networking established the flows of migration become more complex and transnational flows 
and social spaces emerge. The number of undocumented migrants at the beginning of the 
21st century in Germany is estimated at about 1.5 Mio.; many of them could be considered as 
transmigrants (Alt 2003; Cyrus 2001). Household work and personal services from geriatric 
nurse up to prostitution from Central and Eastern Europe to Germany are often organised as 
undocumented labour migration and in transnational migration networks (Lutz 2002). Illegal 
trafficking of cigarettes, drugs, weapons and women is another and almost different issue 
that often exploits the social networking of transnational migration.  
Summarising, even the strongest State will not be able to control and manage directly all 
migration flows. Social networks once established at a minimum level follow quite different 
logics of action than those established in legal prescriptions of nation states. The latter could 
manage the flows of immigration and settlement, they often initiate programs for return-
migrants, they have an established infrastructure for Diaspora-migrants, but they are quite 
helpless how to direct and administer transnational migration. This is also due to other 
factors. 
 
Double identities – double loyalties 
Transnational migrants were defined by an ambiguous mixture of identity references to the 
region of origin and the region of origin. Whereas for classic immigrants such an ambiguity 
could be observed mainly for the second generation of migrants (Thomas/Znaniecki 1958), in 
the era of globalisation the case of the transnational migrants becomes more complex. Even 
in the third or fourth generation there is a – though minoritarian – share of migrants who do 
no integrate and ‘smelt’ completely in the region and society of arrival but maintain strong 
relations of cultural, social, economic and/or political interchange with the region of origin of 
their ancestors (Portes 1996; Faist 2000). These ongoing nexus to the country of origin 
almost always existed, but gradually died out – the region where the forefathers came from 
remained as an historical reminiscence and abstract category of identification. But due to 
modern communication and transport technologies in nowadays it is quite easy to maintain 
direct and quasi face-to-face contacts to people in different locales far away from the place of 
physical residence. Thereby, the ‘social residence’ of a transmigrant could span over 
different physical places (Pries 2001).  
Different aspects of these double or transnational identities are quite well documented by 
empirical studies. For the USA-Dominican Republic and the USA-Hawai relations see the 
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studies of Grasmuck/Pessar (1991) and Basch et al. (1994). Luin Goldring (2001) analysed 
the changing gender roles and social orders in Mexico-USA-migration due to the emergence 
of transnational women organisations. Martínez (1998) developed an interesting typology of 
people living in the border between Mexico and the USA taking into account their patterns of 
physical movements, their value systems, consumption patterns and the ‘borderlands milieu’; 
he identified a total of two types of national borderlanders and seven types of transnational 
borderlanders, where the ‘Mexican American Binationalists’ are characterised by quite stable 
patterns of double identity and double loyalty  (op.cit., 91ff). Palenga-Möllenbeck (2005) 
documented long term and second to third generation transnational identities and social 
practices for the case of Silesian people living between Germany and Poland (see also 
Morawska 1998; for Russian Jews see e.g. Kalačeva/Karpenko 1997). 
Transnational or double identities also are in play in recent conflicts like the riots in autumn 
2005 in Paris and other French cities when second or third generation Maghrebian migrants 
protested against economic marginalisation despite their being formally French citizens. In a 
similar way, in Germany many young people with Turkish migrants as parents or 
grandfathers do neither feel German nor Turkish, but ‘in between’. The difference to the 
traditional immigration situation is that these people even in the third generation still or 
increasingly are living in a migratory social field and do not follow the traditional assimilation 
or integration patterns widely described by the Chicago school of migration research 
(Goebel/Pries 2003; Pries 2004a and 2004b). Transnational migrants often feel sympathy, 
attachment and loyalty with different aspects of different national societies and cultures and 
with different nation states. For the latter, this is a complex challenge due to the constitutive 
element of each nation state: its capability to defend the monopoly of physical violence in 
and the integrity of the state territory and the chance to maintain a minimum of exclusive 
loyalty of all its citizens.  
In this sense, double identities and double loyalties of transnational migrants challenge the 
traditional nation states’ role and understanding. Regarding their sovereignty and the 
people’s loyalty, the nation states are becoming more and more ‘punctured’ due to economic, 
political, cultural and social globalisation and transnationalisation (Pries 2005). But 
independently of how one should and would judge these developments, they have to be 
taken as ‘social facts’ in the sense of Emile Durkheim, and all empirical findings indicate that 
there will be no return to the ex ante situation of the more or less ingenuous project of 
sovereign nation states fighting for or even being able to control effectively their external 
boundaries and flows of migrants.  
This ‘collateral damage’ of the internationalisation dynamics and especially of the 
transnationalisation process to the nation state and national society project so dominant 
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during the last two centuries should not be taken exclusively as a threat. Double identities or 
even more: complex multidimensional and multi-level identities, fluid in time and trajectory 
are emerging anyway as part of the social spaces people are creating by their social 
practice, systems of symbols and artefacts in the 21st century. Dual identities and loyalties 
are developed by quite all human beings towards their parents – and (quite) nobody forces 
us to decide between father and mother. Therefore, dual identities towards nation states and 
national societies of the transnational migrants could be a challenge and threat, e.g. in the 
case of criminal and terrorist groups taking full advantage of transnational movements and 
dual citizenship. But they also could be and – in the vast majority of the cases of 
transnational migrants – they definitely are the actually way people construct their lives and 
span new transnational social spaces. By this way, transnational identities and dual loyalties 
could be considered not as the ‘cement of society’ (Elster 1989), but as the cement between 
societies. This leads directly to another ‘cement between societies’: migrant workers’ 
remittances. 
 
Remittances as long term socio-economic and political factor 
As mentioned in the second section, during the last two decades or so for many countries 
remittances became a very important economic and political issue. It was argued that the 
increasing weight of these remittances could not be explained sufficiently by the increasing 
number of international migrants in general because their growth rate was significantly less 
than that of remittances’ amount. Even taking into account such factors like shifting of 
remittances flows from informal and undocumented channels (like sending money with 
friends or the Hawala system) to formalised and registered channels (like bank services) and 
like the changing definition of remittances by international bodies like the World Bank (World 
Bank 2005) and the exchange rate of the US Dollar, there remains some evidence that new 
figures and patterns of international migration, especially transnational migration, is in play as 
well. Meanwhile traditional emigration/immigration and traditional return-migration lead to 
decreasing amounts and flows of remittances, the transnational migration pattern leads to 
predict ongoing or even increasing high levels of remittances. 
Taking the most recent Annual Report of the World Bank (2005) it is by no means surprising 
that it deals mainly with remittances. Whereas between 1995 and 2004 the total amounts of 
foreign direct investments increased from 107 to 166 billion US Dollar, the official 
development assistance grew from 59 to 79 billion US Dollar and the private debt and 
portfolio equity even decreased from 170 to 136 billion US Dollar, the international flows of 
workers’ remittances almost tripled from 58 to 160 billion US Dollars (op.cit.:88). Comparing 
not only the growth dynamics of these different kinds of foreign currency incomes in the 
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world economy, but also considering the total amount of remittances it is foreseeable that the 
latter could outstrip the total of foreign direct investments in the near future: the strongest 
‘foreign investment’ worldwide would then be the migrant workers! Besides capital markets 
also some segments of labour markets are becoming global.  
This leads to some severe questions and challenges. The good news is that international 
labour migration in general helps poorer countries to reduce the total volume of workers 
searching for labour in the country of origin itself. Like the massive emigration from European 
countries in the context of industrialisation during the 19th and beginning 20th century, the 
modern transnational migration of the 21st century works as a ‘pressure-relief valve’ in the 
context of the mobilisation effects of economic industrialisation and cultural modernization. 
Remittances deriving from this international migration dynamics play a crucial role for life 
strategies of individuals and households, but also for development policies and foreign 
currency balances of nation states.  
Transnational migration networks and remittances flows once established normally reach 
such a level of stability and durability that not only families but even governments could rely 
on them. They get a long-term economic and political character. Some examples could 
reveal these far reaching effects. In 1997, the then Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo 
declared in a public event in Chicago: “I have proudly affirmed that the Mexican nation 
extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders.” Against the spirit of the US 
naturalisation policy he announced a Mexican constitutional amendment allowing Mexicans a 
double citizenship, especially to retain their Mexican nationality even though they become 
U.S. citizens. In the same line the new Mexican President Vicente Fox declared in 2001 that 
“the Mexican nation extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders”. Hereby he 
referred to the almost 18 million Mexicans living abroad, mainly in the USA. The Mexican 
government developed cultural programs like the ‘Guadalupana communities’ program to 
strengthen the mexicanidad (the Mexican feelings and loyalties) mainly in the group of 
Mexican migrants in the USA. It also defined development programs inviting migrants to 
invest a part of their remittances in productive projects like land irrigation or installing drinking 
water tubes in small villages.  
For other countries the working migrants also function as ‘bridgeheads’ of exportation and 
commerce of goods and services. In the case of India, a part of the IT specialists that worked 
in the USA and in Europe went back to their country of origin or organised It service networks 
from their countries of arrival strengthening the diversification strategies of governmental 
development programs. For poorer countries like Haiti, Ecuador or Nicaragua the 
transnational flows of migrants and their remittances meanwhile are simply an important part 
of the countries economic survival. The millions of Asians working as migrants in the Near 
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East and mainly in the rich petroleum exporting countries like Saudi Arabia simply shifted 
substantially the way the sending countries’ governments look at the oil price: These 
countries experienced that a strongly falling oil price reduces migrants’ workplaces and 
remittances from these oil exporting countries. Some of the latter aspects lead directly to the 
question of brain drain and brain gain. 
 
Brain drain or brain gain 
The complex and not one-time-one-direction patterned transnational migration flows make it 
difficult to estimate the overall net earning of migration in terms of education and cultural 
capital. For a long time the ‘brain drain’ hypothesis was strong stating that normally not the 
poorest and less educated people migrate but well prepared middle class persons that feel a 
structural lag between their capabilities and their opportunities at home. Therefore, according 
to this argument, migration leads in sum to a brain drain from the developing to the 
developed countries. Although a lot of empirical data support this reasoning for the 
emigration type, return-migration and transnational migration complicate this picture.  
Even differentiating for ethnic groups, regions of origin and regions of arrival, all over the 
world there are significant proportions of return-migrants and of transnational migrants 
enriching the educational and cultural landscape in their countries and regions of origin. 
Returning migrant workers come back with new knowledge, new attitudes and values and 
with new contacts and social capital. They often engage as entrepreneurs opening a shop or 
workshop; they also work as nodes for transnational commercial networks distributing new 
goods and services (e.g. everything related with IT or Internet) in their regions of origin or 
collecting traditional raw material or products (e.g. traditional art crafts or food) to be sold in 
the regions of arrival.  
In the case of the traditional Chinese Huanxi based economic networking the transnational 
migrants represent the social texture within which the flows of goods, services and money 
are organised between different countries (e.g. electronic components from Malaysia to 
China, textiles from China to Canada, software from the USA to China, toys, candles and 
fireworks from China to the USA; see Ong/Nonini 1997). Another example is labour migration 
between Germany and Poland. One important field of activities for Polish women working in 
Germany was and still is household work, healthcare and geriatric nursing. At the mid of the 
first decade of the new century there emerge strategies to develop the geriatric nursing 
sector in Poland itself aiming at the relatively wealthy German clients. In this case, Polish 
migrants’ knowledge and experience gained in Germany could return as ‘brain gain’ to 
strengthen this healthcare service sector oriented development strategy.  
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An outstanding example is the Indian IT industry. During the 1980s and 1990s Indian IT 
specialists emigrated to the USA and e.g. to Germany in order to work as program 
developers and programmers at a medium level of qualification. Some of these IT migrants 
were successful in ascending the qualification and positional ladder in the receiving 
countries, some of them went back to their countries of origin working there as high 
experienced specialists, and some of them engaged in transnational enterprises offering 
mainly software services to the off shoring big international hardware and software 
companies (Athreye 2005). By this way, Indian IT-immigrants in the USA, Indian return-IT-
migrants from the USA and Europe, and Indian transnational IT-migrants interacted in 
developing the Indian IT-sector from a small range of It-services offering industry towards a 
more vertically integrated complex sector. All in all, the balance of brain drain and brain gain 
of labour migration is difficult to summarize in a very general term. It depends on the 
migrants’, governments’ and companies’ strategies, the trajectory and time curve when 
entering into a special field of activities and the general context of the countries involved.  
 
The challenge of transnational criminal and terrorist networks 
Whereas the challenges and opportunities of migrants and states could be quite equilibrated 
in the aforementioned cases, transnational migration represents important opportunities for 
criminal and terrorist networks and definitely strong challenges for states, organisations and 
most of the migrants themselves. One crucial problem is to distinguish harmless from 
harmful norm violation. There is no objective shared view of what is criminal and harmful and 
what is undocumented or illegal but harmless – it is a continuum where different individuals, 
social groups and countries mark the difference between legitimate, illegal and criminal in 
different ways. This continuum begins by overstaying a tourist visa or by working with a 
tourist visa, it goes on by crossing illegally borders oneself or helping others to do so without 
receiving any money, it goes on with offering services of illegal border crossing for relatives 
and community members receiving some money or other equivalent, it goes on with 
smuggling people and goods according to established remunerations, it goes on with 
trafficking special groups of migrants like photo models and sex workers, it goes on with 
promising women to work as photo model or free sex worker and then actually subordinating, 
forcing and locking them up as slaves, it goes on with smuggling cigarettes and other goods 
without paying the corresponding taxes, it goes on with trafficking hard drugs and weapons 
with innocent migrants, it goes on with maintaining active and strong transnational criminal 
networks based on transnational migration of some of the criminal persons and it ends with 
transnational terrorist networks that take advantage of all the aforementioned forms of 
transnational ties.  
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Whereas a border patrol officer at the Mexican-USA-boarder will mark the undocumented 
boarder crossing of a small group of pour peasants as illegal and worth to persecute, the 
peasant migrants themselves and their ‘pollero’ (migrants smuggler) will not feel any guilt or 
bad conscience. Whereas the financial offices and customs of a country will understand the 
selling and buying of an entire shipload of cigarettes for the exclusive purpose of smuggling 
them into countries where the taxes on cigarettes are higher, the selling company will 
interpret this selling as a normal business, and the smugglers will think of it as a smart taking 
advantage of the different tax regulations. Even the instructors in a terrorist training camp will 
not feel as terrorists but as teachers giving volunteers the opportunity to learn something for 
their ‘justified fight against the Godless’.  
In sum, the making of distinctions, the differentiating tolerable from non-tolerable ways of 
migration and transnational boarder activities in a formal-legal and State perspective is quite 
easy and without problems, but in the real social life, it is a matter of interpretation and of 
interests. From a sociological and social science standpoint, governmental policies and 
politics of controlling migration flows will failure if the social, cultural, political and economic 
embeddedness of international migration is not taken into account. An older lady in Germany 
that was looking for geriatric nursery for a while without finding any person prepared and 
willing will not ask in a very detailed manner when a Polish or Philippine nurse will offer her 
service. Those migrant workers could have entered legally the country but then overstay their 
visa or doing other things than they were allowed for. They even could ask for the services of 
providers of visa or other documents that operate more in the black and illegal economy. 
From here up to the ‘hard core’ criminal and terrorist networks there is a broad and 
differentiated continuum.  
Taking into account that the so called black economy represents a share of about a fourth to 
half (or even more) of the gross domestic product of quite all countries of the world it is 
difficult or even impossible to separate in a simple manner formal-legal from undocumented 
from completely illegal migration. This is exactly what makes governmental strategies so 
difficult and often so little successful. Acknowledging these entanglements of the very 
different forms of migration is by no means accepting and tolerating them in total. But it is 
definitely the only promising starting point for defining realistic strategies and policies of 
controlling migration flows. These migration flows could never be checked and directed 
completely by the nation states. Therefore the latter have to define where to concentrate on 
and how to integrate a police strategy with other means. 
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4. Alternatives to police and military control of migration flows 
All experiences of police and military control strategies of international migration flows 
demonstrate the limits of an isolated control paradigm. At the Mexican-USA-boarder the up 
and down of formal control strategies influenced the concrete flows of illegal and 
undocumented boarder crossing and the amount of the transfer the migrant has to pay to the 
‘pollero’. Strong police control of undocumented migration normally extends the periods the 
migrants stay in the country of arrival due to the higher risks of being caught up. This type of 
strategy could also – if not combined with other, ‘weak’ elements of boarder control – push 
‘passively’ undocumented migrants and family or community oriented ‘passive’ migrant 
smugglers into more active and more illegal or criminal contexts. When risks and danger of 
being grabbed raise and consequently the amount of money for certain migrants’ transfer 
services elevate, these illegal services become more attractive for certain groups of dealers 
and smugglers. Because of the very limits of an exclusive police strategy of migration control, 
other means should be thought about and developed. They should be at the core of an 
integrated strategy of sending and receiving countries.  
 
Regional development in migrants’ sending regions 
First of all the reasons for international migration flows should be analysed carefully and for 
each case or ‘migration system’ (Fawcett/Arnold 1987; Hillmann 2000) separately. Taking 
into account the demographic dynamics of the old European countries and comparing this 
with the population growth rates e.g. of the Mediterranean countries reveals one strong and 
decisive ‘push-factor’ of international migration: Whereas from 1850 up to 1950 the 
population of Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain grew at an overall 
average of 72%, in the same period the population of Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Turkey, Egypt 
and Tunisia grew at the pace of 181% (Brauch 1997). The overall population growth rates for 
the period from 1950 to 2050 are forecasted as 11% for the old European countries and as 
457% for the Eastern-South-Mediterranean countries. If the late industrialising countries can 
not offer sufficient work and income for this extremely rapidly growing population, an 
increasing share of them will look for work and income in the more developed regions.  
Development and foreign policies of governments should take into account this ‘iron law’ of 
international migration. In this context, the foreign aid as a share of the gross domestic 
product of the highly industrialised countries did not grow according to their self declared 
goals and neither to the needs of a balanced development of the world regions. As 
demonstrated above, incomes from remittances overtook the currency incomes by foreign 
aid at a world scale. Therefore governments in highly industrialised countries should 
reconsider their foreign aid programs that – under the perspective of strong migration 
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pressures – are definitely not only foreign aid, but also self aid programs. At the same time 
the migrants sending and receiving countries should think of smart policies and programs to 
direct a part of the migrants’ remittances into productive regional development projects in the 
sending countries. Transnational migrants are the most indicated partners for such 
programs.  
 
Legalisation of undocumented migrants 
Countries like the USA, Spain, France and even Switzerland experienced different ways of 
legalisation campaigns for undocumented migrants (Bean et al. 1990; Wihtol de Wenden 
1997; Laubenthal 2006). In some cases (as Switzerland) legalisation was an outcome of 
social movements and public political pressure, in some cases (like France) it was mainly a 
result of the historical burden of colonial relationship, and in other cases (as the USA-IRCA 
legislation in 1986) it resulted predominantly from a rational government initiative to put order 
to an increasingly confusing situation. There are some studies about the impacts of legalising 
undocumented migration (op.cit.), and definitely this strategy will not end up with the problem 
of undocumented and illegal migration, as all the cited cases, especially the USA, Spain and 
France reveal.  
In general, legalised, formerly undocumented migration will induce further migration, mainly 
reunite divided families. But this was the case also in other contexts where governments like 
the German or the US-American had to accept the failure of their ‘guestworker’ or ‘Bracero-
return-migrant’-programs. In the German case, ‘guest-workers’ initially were thought to be 
changed every two to three years in order not to take root in Germany. When this strategy 
definitely failed (due to migrants’ and employers’ protests) and ‘guestworkers’ were able to 
stay for longer periods, reunification of divided families was a socially and politically 
unavoidable consequence. Therefore, legalising undocumented migrants will lead to more 
migration and will lead to a higher degree of immigration, mainly of direct family members. 
Similar to other contexts, this facilitates social accountability and stability for both, the 
migrants themselves and the receiving societies.  
At the same time, one part of the legalised migrants could turn into transnational migrants 
because switching between countries now is easier. Many regional airlines all over the world 
and even many flight lines of big international airlines (like the Lufthansa flights from 
Düsseldorf to Kiev) are possible due to legalisation of at least a part of the border crossing 
migration streams. In general, legalisation of undocumented migration allows countries to 
better know and understand the migration dynamics and to better manage it. Taking 
advantage of transnational migrants for international trade and transnational business is 
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much easier counting with legal migrants than with undocumented ones. Legalisation could 
reduce the ‘ports of entry’ for criminal and terrorist transnational activities.  
 
Committing transnational migrant organisations 
Another alternative or complementary strategy to a police centred perspective on 
undocumented migration problems is compromising the organisations of transnational 
migrants. As Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (2001) analysed taking the example of Turkish 
migrants’ organisations in the Netherlands and in Germany, there could be distinguished 
different types of international migrant organisations. One part of these organisations is 
mainly concerned with representing the interests of the country of origin in the country of 
arrival (fighting for being able to receive social security benefits of the country of arrival also 
in the country of origin, defending the culture and identity of ‘their’ country and even justifying 
the policy and politics of its governments etc.). These typical Diaspora-organisations are 
attractive for return-migrants, that is, for those who plan to go back to their countries of origin 
with which they identify quite completely.  
Another part of migrants’ organisations focuses mainly on the problems and interests in the 
region of arrival (fighting for additional integration programs for migrants’ children in the 
education system like additional language courses, demanding Muslim cemeteries in the 
community they are living in the country of arrival, fighting for equal job opportunities for 
ethnic minorities and migrants etc.). This type of migrants’ organisations obviously reflects 
mainly the interests of immigrants, of those who plan to stay and incorporate in the country 
and society of arrival. These organisations could even be quite critical towards the 
governments of their countries of origin and develop strong ties to political organisations and 
parties in the countries of arrival. 
A third type of migrants’ organisations could be of a transnational character and express the 
situation and interests of transnational migrants (promoting the mutual understanding and 
interchange between the countries they feel adherent to in some way, fighting for bilateral 
programs of economic cooperation, developing common cultural programs, fighting against 
narrow national views in both sides etc.). It is just this third type of transnational migrant 
organisations that emerges with the new type of transnational migrants itself and that could 
figure as an important instrument to reduce the threats and to strengthen the opportunities of 
transnational migration. Transnational migrants and their organisations feel loyalty with both, 
the country of origin and the country of arrival. They often know better how to effectively 
control the negative effects of transnational interactions. By this way, the same forces that 
challenge national and international migration policies and politics could be useful for 
exploiting new opportunities. 
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